A Ruble for Your Peace?

The original 28-point US-brokered plan for ending the Russia-Ukraine war had me shaking my head. The unprovoked invasion by the Putinist regime of its neighbor looked to be rewarded after all, as Ukraine was being asked to violate some of its own sovereignty because of the spoilt child attitude of the Russian dictatorship. Indeed, despite some vague promises of a “powerful global package of measures” and Ukraine maintaining its eligibility to join the European Union, this plan looked like a win for the Russians.

Besides these meaningless points, the Russians got what they wanted in terms of both territory and sanctions. It would have gained de facto recognition over Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as well as basically Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. It would have achieved full reintegration into the global economy after years of sanctions. And it would have boxed its neighbor into being its province without much that Ukraine could do about it, with restrictions on its military and NATO membership. Above all, the peace agreement would have meant neither side could be prosecuted for war crimes, depriving civilian victims of any recourse.

In essence, Ukraine was looking to be Versailles'ed by its aggressors.

The concern raised by European governments over the peace plan has been critical for Ukraine at this moment. With Washington’s flip-flopping from Russian stooge to sending Zelensky Tomahawk missiles, Europe has come in critically to stop Ukraine being steamrolled by some Morgenthauian trap between great powers. Ursula von der Leyen’s public criticism of the plan has been joined by many other world leaders who have shown solidarity with Kyiv.

Perhaps it was this that made the US revise the plan, to make it more agreeable to the real victims. Though we still don’t know the content, let’s hope it’s better than the last.

Supporting Ukraine against Russian revanchism has been a vital principle. Though the so-called “realists” might argue that such restrictions on Ukrainian sovereignty and appeasement of Russia’s war goals are necessary to achieve “peace”–no matter how unjust–the reality is, handing victories over to dictators simply emboldens them to continue. As we might see with Venezuela and as we have seen with Iran, negotiated settlements between the West and anti-Western despots are rarely maintained and only provide a little breathing room for the regime to continue. In fact, Russia will probably be more confident to pursue its territorial goals–influenced by Dugin’s dream of a united Eurasia–elsewhere, where it doesn’t encroach on NATO territory.

Any plan that benefits Russia more than Ukraine is unacceptable, as should be common sense. This does not mean that we should be averse to any genuine pragmatism when it comes to negotiating a settlement, however. I have long argued that, after a decisive Western victory, an internationally observed referendum should be held in Crimea for the Crimeans to decide, fairly and freely, where they want to belong. But limitations on sovereignty when it comes to the point at which Ukrainians would no longer be able to choose which defense alliances they wish to belong to would 1) be a violation of all principle, and 2) not be sustainable anyway.

So, a revision of this plan is welcome, as rushed, unjust peaces never hold anyway.