Libya and Unfinished Business
When the UN Security Council decided not to prolong the resolution that authorized NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, despite requests from the National Transitional Council, Libya was destined for a Somali-esque future. The disaster that has ensued since has been one of the largest boomerangs of Western foreign policy, leading to much more instability and the urgent terror threat in North Africa from offshoots of the Islamic State.
The NATO military intervention in Libya is the pinnacle of failure of the Obama-era “half-in, half-out” foreign policy. In desperate aversion to repeating the original Blair-Bush mistakes, the then-US president made all his own new ones. Trying to do something while doing nothing is paradigmatic of politicians, but rarely does it have as disastrous consequences as it has in Libya. Unlike the intervention to overthrow Saddam Hussein, where the US troops fought shoulder to shoulder with Kurdish and anti-insurgent forces, the NATO coalition kept as close as possible to achieving its interests while far enough away not to bear responsibility for the post-Gaddafi Libya.
Even without the exaggerations over the threats to civilians, the removal of Muammar Gaddafi was justified. Decades of one of the most arbitrary and brutal totalitarian dictatorships in Africa, engaging in mass murder, repression, and severe restriction on human liberty, would have merited an intervention at some point. Years of supporting terrorist activity abroad, violating the nuclear proliferation treaty, and invading Chad and Egypt, made it a significant threat to the international community and to peace. After the US overthrew Saddam Hussein, it also discovered the extent of the A.Q. Khan network’s black market of nuclear proliferation materials that included Libya, North Korea, and Iran—a stockpile that Gaddafi willingly gave up to the Bush administration and is now locked away in Tennessee.
The Arab Spring brought with it a tremendous amount of revolutionary energy to overthrow the brutal dictators that had dominated the Middle East and North Africa for decades. As Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt fell, the Libyans saw an opportunity to finally rid themselves of Gaddafi and join their neighbors in the hope of forming a democracy. The result, however, wasn’t pleasant. While the removal of Saddam Hussein had led to his capture and trial, due mainly to the US occupation of the country, when rebels finally found a bloodied Gaddafi, he was not given the same courtesy. His extrajudicial murder, though not requiring any sympathy, was an indication of the type of Libya to emerge.
After years of civil war, the lackadaisical intervention by France, the UK, and the US in removing Gaddafi has come back to bite them. Not least is the influx of refugees and migrants that are traded through human traffickers on the northern coast (which has increased compared to all other countries), but also the deep consequences the relative inaction has had today. As most of the Sahel Belt has become overwhelmed by Islamist terrorism and Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all become hostile to the West, Libya is looking to follow the same path, especially with the expulsion of EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner. With Russian involvement in Africa in the form of the Wagner mercenaries to help fight jihadists, Europe is rapidly losing out on influence in the region. Russia, which has suffered a defeat with losing its ally Assad in Syria, is now pursuing a base where it could corner Europe with a pincer from Belarus to Libya.
Libya stands as a warning for not following through with your regime changes properly, and as a wake-up call for Europeans to start dealing with both the terror and jihadist threat growing in Africa.


As the Sahel emerges as the global epicenter of jihadist violence, the recent joint US-Nigerian strikes signal a long-awaited strategic shift toward collaborative intervention in West Africa.